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Drawing upon interviews with 72 practitioners of automated, ultrafast high-fre-
quency trading (HFT), this paper identifies the most salient divide within
HFT: between algorithms, trading groups and firms that specialize in ‘making’
(in adding bids to buy and offers to sell to exchanges’ electronic order books)
and those that specialize in ‘taking’ (in executing against existing bids and
offers in those order books). The paper explores how ‘making’ and ‘taking’ algor-
ithms interact, emphasizing the materiality of that interaction (including, e.g. the
surprising effect on it of rain), and suggesting the importance of the ‘material pol-
itical economy’ of algorithmic trading: the shaping of that trading, in economically
consequential ways, by material orderings that could be different.
Keywords: high-frequency trading; materiality; market-making; algorithm;
material political economy; social studies of finance.
In many of the world’s most important financial markets, most trading is now
by algorithms.1 The trading pits of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
crowded with human beings, are now almost all closed. Humans still trade
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with keyboard and mouse, but in many markets most trading is now by compu-
ter algorithms, especially ultrafast high-frequency trading (HFT) algorithms. The
transformation is still being digested. There is a growing literature in economics
on HFT (most recently reviewed by Menkveld, 2016), and a smaller but vigorous
sociological literature, the best collection of which is in the May 2016 special issue
of this journal, ‘Cultures of high-frequency trading’ (Lange et al., 2016).
This paper makes four contributions to the sociological literature on HFT.
The first is to highlight the diversity of HFT practices. While the special
issue and the insightful examination of algorithmic cultures in Seyfert and
Roberge (2016) are careful to invoke ‘cultures’ in the plural, the best existing
treatment of diversity (Seyfert, 2016) compares the epistemic regime of high-
frequency traders with those of regulators and of market analysts who are
critics of HFT, rather than probing differences among the practices of HFT
firms. In contrast, this paper discusses the single most important divide
within HFT and, simultaneously, examines the two main ‘species’ of HFT
algorithm. The divide is between HFT firms, trading groups and algorithms
that specialize in ‘making’ or ‘providing liquidity’ (which means entering into
exchanges’ computer systems bids to buy and offers to sell that cannot immedi-
ately be executed) and firms, groups and algorithms that specialize in ‘taking
liquidity’: in entering orders that can be executed straightaway against existing
bids and offers.
The divide between ‘making’ and ‘taking’ sounds like a narrow technicality,
but is actually both fascinating and important: for example, it is felt by some
practitioners of automated trading to have an affective, even a moral, aspect.
Above all, analysis of the divide helps us understand how HFT algorithms
interact, which is – as Borch points out, also in this journal – a pivotal topic
for today’s economic sociology (Borch, 2016). When humans traded directly
with humans, it was conceptually straightforward to see how standard parts
of sociology’s disciplinary repertoire could be applied to trading (as, e.g. in
the classic application of social network analysis by Baker, 1984). What,
however, might it mean – theoretically, methodologically – to apply economic
sociology to algorithms trading with other algorithms? In the wake of Callon’s
and Latour’s actor-network theory (with its major influence on economic soci-
ology via the work of Muniesa and many others: see, e.g. Callon et al., 2007;
MacKenzie et al., 2007), it hardly seems satisfactory to say that we sociologists
will study the human beings who program and supervise the algorithms, while
leaving to others the investigation of the algorithms themselves and of how they
interact – even if, as noted below, that investigation involves methodological dif-
ficulties. The second contribution of the research reported here is thus its
identification of four distinct styles of algorithmic ‘taking’, each associated
with a distinctive form of making/taking interaction. Only one of these forms
of interaction – the ‘picking-off’ of ‘stale quotes’: see below – has previously
been researched in any depth (by Budish et al., 2015).
The paper’s third contribution is its empirical investigation of the material
nature of making/taking interaction. Although the authors of the May 2016
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special issue would all agree that HFT algorithms interact materially, attention
to materiality in the existing sociological literature on HFT has been limited.
(The researcher on HFT most sensitive to materiality is the anthropologist,
publisher and graphic designer Alexandre Laumonier, with his remarkable
work documenting the paths followed in Europe by HFT’s microwave
links.2) Because the materiality of HFT is crucial to the success of HFT
firms, it is a sensitive topic in interviewing, and building the necessary trust
and technical understanding takes time. (For example, it was only after
several years that I came to understand the impact of rain on making/taking
interaction.) Materialism comes, of course, in many flavours, ranging from
Marxism to, for instance, anthropological perspectives (e.g. Miller, 2005) or
media theory (e.g. Parikka, 2015). One example, however, of a helpful theoriza-
tion is the materialism of what one might call ‘late actor-network theory’ or ‘late
ANT’, from around 2000–2002 onwards (the years of de Laet and Mol’s [2000]
study of the Zimbabwe bush pump and Mol’s The body multiple [2002]). ‘Late
ANT’ materialism makes fully explicit that materiality is not given or fixed, but
processual and enacted: ‘late ANT’ is, to paraphrase Law (2010), a materialism
of verbs, not nouns. Of course, the enactment of materiality need not involve
human beings at all, but in almost all actor-network studies it does. The materi-
ality on which ANT scholars actually focus is sociomateriality: practices and
processes, via which materiality takes shape, that involve human beings as
well as non-human ‘actants’.
An ‘enactment materialism’ is analytically suitable because it supports this
paper’s fourth contribution: its investigation of what I will call the ‘material pol-
itical economy’ of the interaction of trading algorithms. How HFT algorithms
interact materially is strongly shaped by the technological systems within which
interaction takes place, and how such a system is designed is ‘political’ in the
sense of, for example, Law and Mol’s ‘material politics’: it involves ‘a material
ordering of the world… that contrasts with alternative and equally possible
modes of ordering’ (Law & Mol, 2008, p. 141).3 Different possible orderings
can have substantially differential effects on ‘making’ and ‘taking’ (there are,
e.g. a number of influential efforts materially to favour ‘making’ algorithms).
Those orderings can be matters of economic ‘life or death’ for HFT firms,
says one interviewee, and are, as argued in the conclusion, of wider importance
too. I use the term ‘material political economy’ here to refer to this issue: econ-
omically consequential material orderings to which there are alternatives.4 The
politics of economic life takes a large variety of forms (monetary, ideological,
coercive, legal, regulatory, party-political, social movement, and so on), but
among them – perhaps increasingly so – are these material orderings. They
remain underexplored, even in the actor-network inspired literature on ‘perfor-
mativity’: the latter term’s origins in the linguistic philosophy of J.L. Austin
(1962) makes it seductively easy to conceive of it as a discursive phenomenon,
rather than one involving assemblages that are simultaneously discursive and
material.
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Precisely because the material practices and systems discussed here are ‘pol-
itical’ in the above broad sense – they are consequential; they could be different;
disputes can take place about them – it is necessary to emphasize that this paper
does not take a position in these disputes. The paper’s use of the practitioners’
terms ‘making’ and ‘taking’ does not imply the preference for the former found
in other contexts (e.g. Foroohar, 2016),5 and the paper seeks simply to illustrate
the possibility of alternative material orderings, not to promote any of them.
The paper’s sections are as follows. After this introduction comes a short
account of data sources, a brief overall introduction to HFT, and a section dis-
cussing ‘making’. Next come brief sections on each of the four styles of making
and on the technological systems that shape making/taking interaction. I return
to material political economy in the final section, the conclusion.
Data sources
As already suggested, it is not straightforward to find high-frequency traders
prepared to be interviewed in any depth about HFT’s material practices. One
of my interviewees, for example, tried unsuccessfully to persuade an acquain-
tance to speak to me: ‘even though he left over a decade ago, he signed paperwork
going in and out of the company to keep quiet and also he (nor anyone) wants to
get back on [X]’s radar because he has the money and ability to create legal issues
for former employees that speak’ (email from interviewee MI, 26 June 2017; X is
a founder of the HFT firm for which my interviewee’s acquaintance had
worked). Gradually, however, I identified, primarily via snowballing, 72 prac-
titioners of HFT – mostly in the world’s main centres of the activity: Chicago,
New York, London and Amsterdam – who were prepared to be interviewed
in varying degrees of technical depth (14 on more than one occasion; seven of
them three or more times), along with 29 suppliers of technology or communi-
cations links to HFT. Other interviewees included exchange staff, regulators,
etc. Interviewees are anonymized in what follows via two-letter labels.
Interviewing has limitations when it comes to understanding HFT algorithms
and how they interact. When human beings did deals on trading floors, sociol-
ogists could not only quiz traders but also listen and watch, but no-one can in
any literal sense see algorithms interacting with each other. We can still inter-
view – and, if access can be negotiated, observe – those who program and super-
vise those algorithms, but their understanding of the latter’s actions can be
imperfect (as Lange, 2016, documents). For example, I regularly ask intervie-
wees whether their algorithms often identify arbitrage opportunities (in
which, e.g. the same shares can be bought on one exchange more cheaply
than they can be sold on another). One interviewee (BU) answered ‘not
really’, then corrected himself: ‘The truth is… we wouldn’t even know…
we’d just be making money’. His algorithm’s ‘valuation’ (essentially, its price
prediction) ‘will move down for some reason’, but he did not usually take the
time to investigate why.
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Fortunately, however, making/taking interaction has an advantage in this
respect. In contrast to a possibly opaque change in an algorithm’s price predic-
tion, a transaction between a making and a taking algorithm leaves an immediate
trace in the form of an electronic notification (a ‘confirm’) to both parties.
However imperfect interviewees’ understanding of their algorithms, they can
tell, from these ‘confirm’ messages, when those algorithms have bought or
sold. That ‘making’ and ‘taking’ algorithms buy and sell from each other also
enables some aspects of this qualitative, sociological enquiry to be checked
against the results of quantitative research on HFT by economists.
A brief introduction to high-frequency trading
HFT firms are typically recently established and small. Only a handful date
from before 2000, and some firms that have a major presence in HFT have
fewer than 150 staff; even an HFT firm with around 50 staff can be a significant
player. To my knowledge, only two firms heavily engaged in HFT have more
than 1,000 staff, and both also do things other than HFT. Some big banks
used to be active in HFT, but their efforts were often less than fully successful:
the rapid development of the necessary fast, highly specialized software systems
can be difficult in a large, bureaucratic organization. Banks are still active as
automated ‘market-makers’ – see below – in some classes of financial instrument
(such as foreign exchange), albeit typically using systems that are slow by HFT
standards, but ‘taking’ strategies in HFT by banks have effectively been ended
by the post-crisis constraints on banks’ proprietary trading.
The HFT firms I have visited vary widely. Some had offices in bland or even
scruffy buildings; others had spectacular views over Lake Michigan, Manhattan
or London. Most of their offices could pass for those of a generic dotcom firm,
and they usually have something of the relaxed feel of a software start-up. The
staff of HFT firms are mostly young and (at least in the roles closest to trading)
mostly male. Almost no-one wears a business suit – it is common for me, as the
visitor, to be the only person wearing a tie – and the shouting and swearing that
used to happen on banks’ trading floors is rare. The internal organization of the
HFT firms from which my interviewees come varies. Some operate as unified
entities, without even the traditional individual ‘P&L’ (a trader’s profit or loss);
one firm had a computerized ‘signal library’ accessible to all its traders and soft-
ware developers. (What participants call a ‘signal’ is a pattern of data that
informs an algorithm’s trading.) Just as Lange (2016) discovered, however,
other HFT firms are divided into strictly separate trading teams, with deliberate
barriers to communication. One firm, for example, physically separates teams by
placing a row of administrative staff between them, and in its main offices even
plays white noise between the rows to reduce the chance of members of one
team overhearing what is said by members of another. At another compartmen-
talized firm, said a young trader (interviewee AC), ‘you… could get in trouble
for being in the next room talking to someone you’re not supposed to talk to’.6
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High-frequency materially happens not in HFT firms’ offices, but in
exchanges’ computer datacentres.7 Around two dozen datacentres globally
host the vast bulk of the world’s financial trading. For example, almost all
US financial futures trading happens in the datacentre shown in Figure 1,
while nearly all the automated trading of other financial instruments (shares,
currencies, Treasury bonds, etc.) takes place in a further seven datacentres in
northern New Jersey. Four datacentres in the United Kingdom – in Slough,
Basildon, the City of London, and London’s Docklands – host major exchanges;
a fifth, Interxion’s datacentre on London’s Brick Lane, is popular with HFT
firms because of its central location and proximity to the London Stock
Exchange’s systems. The most important datacentre for HFT on the Continent
is FR2 in Frankfurt am Main. These datacentres are huge warehouses, largely
windowless, packed with many thousands of computer servers, powerful
cooling systems to extract the heat the servers generate, mile upon mile of
cabling, and almost no human beings beyond a few maintenance and security
personnel. (Because of tight security, visits to datacentres are hard to arrange,
but I have been able to visit two of them.)
Although the internal spatial layout of datacentres varies, there is consider-
able structural similarity among exchanges’ technical systems (see Figure 2).
The heart of any modern electronic exchange is its ‘matching engines’. These
are computer systems that maintain the ‘order book’ for each financial instru-
ment that the exchange trades. For a ‘human-eyes’ visual representation of an
order book, see Figure 3, but all modern order books are simply data files:
Figure 1 The datacentre of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the most important in
global finance. The microwave dishes via which signals from this datacentre travel to
New Jersey and elsewhere, which are currently in a variety of locations close to the data-
centre, are being centralized on the pylon under construction on the right of the picture.
Source: courtesy Bird & Renoult. See http://bird-renoult.net/antenna-gods-us-edition-
2018/.
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ordered lists of all the bids to buy and offers to sell the financial instrument
being traded that have not yet been executed. HFT firms normally ‘co-locate’
their trading servers: install them in the same datacentre as the exchange’s
matching engines. Bids to buy and offers to sell by the algorithms running on
HFT firms’ servers (and their cancellations of bids and offers) take the form
of electronic messages to the exchange’s systems, and arrive at the matching
engines via exchange computers known as ‘order gateways’ (see Figure 2). An
exchange’s ‘feed servers’ or ‘market data publishers’ are computers that
receive streams of order-book updates – transactions, new orders, cancellations
of orders – from the matching engines, and dispatch them in anonymized form
as a datafeed, sold to trading firms, that enables them to synthesize their own
constantly updated mirrors of the exchange’s order books.
Making
Most of the direct and indirect interaction of trading algorithms is mediated by
order books – for exceptions, see MacKenzie (forthcoming) – and what differ-
entiates a ‘making’ from a ‘taking’ order is its price relative to that of the existing
Figure 2 Inside a data centre: highly schematic. Arrows indicate the direction in which
electronic messages flow. For example, a trading firm’s system sends orders (and cancel-
lations of orders) to an ‘order gateway’, which in turn sends that system a ‘confirm’
message when, e.g. one of its orders has been executed. For that system to learn as
quickly as possible about transactions (and other ‘order book’ changes) not involving
the firm, the latter has to pay the exchange for the datafeed from, and an ultrafast con-
nection to, its feed servers.
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orders in the book. Consider the order book in Figure 3. A bid to buy shares at
$29.49 would be a ‘making’ order. The matching engine cannot execute it
immediately, because there are no offers to sell at that price to match it with.
Instead, the matching engine would simply add it to the order book’s queue
of bids at $29.49. In most exchanges, that queue is a time-priority list: a new
bid to buy at $29.49 will be executed only when all earlier bids at that price
have been executed or cancelled. In contrast, a bid to buy at $29.50 would be
a ‘taking’ order. The matching engine can execute it straightaway (perhaps
only partially if it is large), because there are offers to sell at that price. Doing
so removes these existing orders from the book: hence the terminology of
‘taking’.
In an exchange of the sort in which HFT is prevalent, most ‘making’ and
most ‘taking’ orders are placed by algorithms. The core mechanism of direct
interaction among trading algorithms is this straightforward process of match-
ing: ‘taking’ orders being matched with (executed against) ‘making’ orders at the
same price. That mechanism is so simple that it is hard to imagine that much
pivots on it, and the difference between the prices of a ‘making’ and a
‘taking’ order on a modern electronic exchange is normally very small (the
one-cent difference in Figure 3 between a bid that ‘makes’ and a bid that
‘takes’ is 0.03 per cent of the market price, and differences of roughly that
Figure 3 An order book.
Source: Author’s interviews and observations of trading.
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size are typical). Yet this simple mechanism and tiny difference are experienced
by some participants as having a moral, affective weight. The words chosen by
interviewee BQ are unusually strong, but the underlying sentiment is not
unique: ‘I tend to want to work at [HFT] companies that are “makers”
because I see the inherent evil in the “takers”’.
The ‘moral’ preference for ‘making’ rests on the legitimacy of its most sys-
tematic form: ‘market-making’. This involves an algorithm continually
keeping both bids to buy and offers to sell in the order book, at or close to
the highest bid price and lowest offer price. In the order book in Figure 3,
for example, the first-in-the-queue bid to buy 100 shares at $29.49 and the
first-in-the-queue offer to sell 100 shares at $29.50 might both have been
entered by the same market-making algorithm. Although the goal is economic
(to earn the one-cent difference between those two prices, along with any pay-
ments the exchange may make to incentivize market-making), algorithmic
‘making’ inherits the legitimacy of a traditional human role: that of the
‘market-maker’, who constantly stood ready both to buy the financial instru-
ment being traded and to sell it (at a somewhat higher price).
Because other market participants’ bids and offers arrive only sporadically,
market-makers – whether human or algorithmic – provide a service to market
participants who want to transact immediately. Interviewee OH highlights the
continuing potency of that source of legitimacy when she recounts an episode
in her algorithmic market-making firm at the height of the global financial
crisis of 2007–2008. A software developer had left her firm, saying: ‘I
couldn’t look my grandmother in the face anymore and say I worked in
finance’. The firm’s chief executive called a trading-room meeting of all its
employees, and (as my interviewee recollects) told them, ‘I’m going to
explain to you why you should be able to look your grandmother in the face:
because we’re market-makers and we provide liquidity’. Another interviewee
(OG, who managed to shift another algorithmic market-making firm towards
‘taking’ strategies) describes the resistance he faced from the firm’s traders:
‘ask them, do we market-take? “No, no, no”, as if you asked them if they
would stab their sister, really strongly against that. But we had to change’.
Specialists in ‘taking’ reject this ‘moralization’ of making (as indeed do some
specialists in the latter). They (e.g. interviewees BY and CU) cite taking’s
central role in what economists call ‘price discovery’; its role (via arbitrage, as
mentioned above) in keeping prices in different markets aligned; the ‘service’
(interviewee CU) it provides to those who wish to trade using ‘making’
orders (which, other things being equal, is cheaper than ‘taking’); and the
plain fact that without ‘taking’ an exchange would have no trading. Further-
more, as OG’s desire for change indicates, legitimacy – being able to ‘look
your grandmother in the face’ – does not guarantee economically successful
market-making. As AG puts it, ‘you make a little bit of money’, from your algor-
ithm repeatedly selling at a price higher than that at which it buys, but ‘you
periodically get run over’: your market-making algorithm buys when prices
are about to fall, or sells when prices are about to rise.
Donald MacKenzie: ‘Making’, ‘taking’ and the material political economy of
algorithmic trading 509
The risk of being run over (which can cancel out a long period of repeated
small gains) has two implications. First, a market-making algorithm has to
keep its ‘inventory’ (its aggregate trading position) reasonably small. ‘[Y]ou
have to actively control your inventory’, says AE: if inventory starts to rise, a
market-making algorithm will ‘shade’ its bids or offers so as to reduce it. If,
for example, too many of its bids have been executed, it will reduce the price
of its offers so as to make those more attractive. If that fails, it may begin to
‘take’: in this example, reducing its inventory by executing against existing
bids in the order book. (That occasional need for a market-making algorithm
to ‘take’ is one of the ways in which the divide between ‘making’ and ‘taking’
is not absolute).
Second, almost all market-making algorithms make predictions of near-future
price movements, and use those predictions to minimize the risk of being ‘run
over’. As BL says: ‘markets move and you need to know when they’re going to
move because [otherwise] you’ll be inventorying at a terrible price’. In all the
markets in which HFT is active there are a number of classes of ‘signal’ that
algorithms employ to predict price changes: see Table 1 for the main classes
used in share trading. These signals need ‘squashed’, as BM put it: to inform
how an algorithm trades, they need reduced to a single indicator. Although a
variety of mathematical forms of ‘squashing’ are in use, HFT interviewees con-
sistently report that by far the most common is for algorithms to combine signals
via what is essentially a linear regression equation, in which a set of predictor
variables (here, signals) are each ‘weighted’ so that in combination they best
predict the value of a single ‘dependent variable’. In HFT, that variable is a
near-term prediction of the price of the financial instrument being traded,
based on signals of the kind listed in Table 1. One market-making HFT firm,
London-based XTX Markets, even advertises the salience of regression. I
assumed its name was one of the quasi-acronyms common in business, but
when I read it etched in glass I realized that it was XTX, a pervasive operation
in regression analysis (the multiplication of a data matrix by its transpose).
Table 1 The main classes of ‘signal’ used in HFT in shares
1. Futures lead: changes in market for share-index futures (which usually slightly
precede changes in the market in the underlying shares).
2. Order-book dynamics: transactions in the shares being traded and other changes in the
composition of the order book for them on the exchange on which an algorithm is
trading, e.g. changes in the balance of bids to buy the shares and offers to sell them.
3. Fragmentation: changes in the order books or prices for the same shares on different
exchanges.
4. Related shares and other instruments: changes in the market for, e.g. shares whose
price is correlated with that of the shares being traded.
A ‘signal’ is a data pattern that informs an algorithm’s trading; for more details (including more
specialized classes and the signals used in trading other classes of financial instrument) see
MacKenzie (2018).
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Nothing in principle stops a market-making algorithm from also ‘taking’, and
my interviews reveal that there are, e.g. algorithms that ‘make’ if their price pre-
diction is between the highest bid and lowest offer, and ‘take’ if it is sufficiently
far outside them. Blending of this kind is, however, far less common than one
might expect. It is more usual to find that algorithms, trading groups and firms
specialize either in ‘making’ or ‘taking’: ‘it’s almost like two very different strat-
egies and thought processes’ (interviewee BF). For example, those interviewees
who headed firms made up of separate trading groups reported that those
groups focused either on making or on taking, not both:
I think there is just something that’s so different about having to have an opinion
all the time [a market-making algorithm has constantly to be making decisions
about its bids and offers] versus occasionally having an opinion [a taking algor-
ithm needs only to identify the intermittent circumstances in which taking will be
profitable]… for some reason those two things can’t really be married without
somehow ruining an aspect of the other one (AG).
The specialization in either making or taking reported by interviewees is con-
firmed by the literature of financial economics on HFT. There are large differ-
ences among firms in the proportions of their algorithms’ trades that are making
and taking, differences that are broadly stable through time: it is unusual for a
firm mostly to ‘make’ in one month, then mostly ‘take’ in the next.8 A prefer-
ence for ‘making’ or for ‘taking’ can indeed be ‘hard-wired’ into an HFT firm’s
technical systems. Interviewee CE, for example, reports discovering this when
he experimented with implementing ‘taking’ algorithms in a leading ‘making’
firm:
[I]f you’re trying to do something different than the system was conceived and
built in the first place, you spend an awful lot of time and energy trying to stop it
from doing what it wants to do. You get into a position and the first thing it
wanted to do was to place an order on the other side [to reduce inventory]…
I want to hold [the position] for five minutes. No, you can’t do that. It’s not
that you couldn’t, but you’d be trying to rework the code…Very, very, very dif-
ficult. (Interviewee CE)
Taking I: ‘to gather the world’s information in one place’
(interviewee CU)
‘Taking’ is more heterogeneous than ‘making’ (space constraints prevent dis-
cussion of differences in styles of making). All HFT ‘taking’ strategies
involve identifying situations in which it is likely that executing against existing
bids and offers in the order book will be profitable, but how that is done varies in
important ways, explored in this and the next three sections. One approach is
for ‘taking’ algorithms to process larger amounts of information than is pro-
cessed by ‘making’ algorithms, or to process it in ways that are mathematically
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more sophisticated. If, by doing this, a ‘taking’ algorithm can improve on
‘making’ algorithms’ price predictions, then there will be profit opportunities.
These are not there continuously, but interviewees (e.g. BY) report that
when they arise ‘taking’ algorithms typically buy or sell substantially larger
quantities of the financial instrument being traded than ‘making’ algorithms do.
Interviewee CU gave the example of a ‘taking’ algorithm trading 10-year US
Treasury bond futures in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s datacentre, shown
in Figure 1. The algorithm will take into account the pattern of bids, offers and
trades in those futures, and patterns in the trading of the other Treasury bond
and interest-rate futures also traded in that datacentre. The algorithm will
receive, via microwave links, data on the buying and selling of the underlying
Treasury bonds, which are traded in two datacentres in New Jersey. Via Hiber-
nia Atlantic’s new, ultrafast transatlantic cable, it will receive data on UK gilt
futures (traded in the datacentre in Basildon) and German sovereign-bond
futures, traded in Frankfurt’s FR2. Data on Japanese government bonds will
come from a transpacific cable and yet more microwave links. The algorithm
will continuously fuse all this information into a prediction of the price of the
futures it is trading, ‘taking’ when it looks profitable to do so.
All of this information is also available to the ‘making’ algorithms of at least
the larger market-making firms. The latter’s algorithms, though, have to be
ultrafast (and therefore not too complex), because of their need to be at or
close to the head of the time-priority queue for executions and the danger of
their quotes becoming stale and being picked-off (see the next section). As
CB, from a very sophisticated market-making firm, puts it: ‘we add, subtract,
multiply and divide really, really well’, in other words very fast indeed.
‘[W]e’re not doing high math and high quant.’ There is, in contrast seldom a
queue to ‘take’. ‘Taking’ algorithms, which ‘aren’t fighting for queue position’,
therefore ‘maybe have just a little more time to quantitatively evaluate what the
market is really saying’, says BY.
That speed can therefore be a less extreme priority in some forms of ‘taking’
than in ‘making’ was, to me, a counterintuitive finding from the interviews, but
one consistent with the financial-economics literature (Brogaard et al., 2015).
Interviewee CU, however, warns that the lessened priority of speed lasts only
until another taking firm ‘begins competing with you’: i.e. discovers and
starts to exploit the same predictive pattern. Put more generally, the computa-
tionally-complex, quantitatively-sophisticated ‘taking’ discussed in this section
is at one end of a spectrum; at the other end is the ‘taking’ discussed in the
next section.
Taking II: picking-off stale quotes
The web, touched on in the previous section, through which the world’s finan-
cial information flows is strongly structured: some places – some ‘centres of cal-
culation’ in the sense of Latour (1987) – are much more important than others;
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what happens in them has direct, highly predictable, and largely unidirectional
effects. I chose the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s (CME’s) datacentre for
Figure 1 because it is the single most important such place worldwide. For
reasons explored in MacKenzie (2018) large transactions on the CME, or sig-
nificant changes in the contents of its most crucial order books, typically
presage changes, both locally in that datacentre and worldwide, that immedi-
ately render many market-making algorithms’ bids or offers out-of-date
(‘stale’). If that happens, a ‘taking’ algorithm has no need for complex modelling:
it can simply ‘pick off’ – profit by trading against – knowably stale bids or offers.
The archetype of this simple, ultrafast, form of taking (discussed by many inter-
viewees and by Budish et al., 2015) is when the price of one of the share-index
futures traded in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s datacentre – especially the
most important such future, the ES, which corresponds to the Standard &
Poor’s 500 share index – suddenly rises or falls. As discussed in MacKenzie
(2018), this is typically followed – less than a hundredth of a second later –
by moves in the same direction in the prices of the underlying shares (especially
in the prices of the corresponding exchange-traded funds [ETFs], which are
composite shares that track the same index). If the algorithms making
markets in those shares and ETFs do not cancel their existing bids or offers
quickly enough, a ‘taking’ algorithm will pick them off. Substantial changes
in the other simple signals universally understood within HFT to have predic-
tive value (see Table 1) give rise to similar ‘picking-off’ opportunities.
‘Picking-off’ creates a speed race between ‘making’ algorithms, seeking to
cancel stale bids or offers, and ‘taking’ algorithms trying to execute against
those stale quotes. In December 2011, one of my first interviewees (AG) esti-
mated the response time needed from an algorithm engaged in this kind of inter-
action as below 5 microseconds (millionths of a second); a recent interviewee –
CR, in April 2018 – says it is now 300 nanoseconds. In some particular contexts
a staggeringly brief 120 nanoseconds seems now feasible.9 (A nanosecond is a
billionth of a second, the time it takes the fastest physically possible signal –
light in free space – to travel a mere 30 centimetres.) Picking-off is one of the
two most important material drivers of what interviewee CR calls ‘an endless
race’ (Budish et al. [2015] call it an ‘arms race’ in speed); the other driver is
the competition among ‘making’ algorithms to be at the front of queues.
Given the current material arrangements of trading, the speed race imposes
unavoidable costs on almost all HFT firms. It requires them, for example, to
use microwave, millimetre wave or atmospheric laser links – via which signals
travel at almost their speed in free space – rather than fibre-optic cable, the
material of which slows light to around two-thirds of its free-space speed.
Hence the influence of rain on the interaction of algorithms. The microwave
links that carry futures prices from Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s datacentre
to the share-trading datacentres in New Jersey can fail when it rains. Conse-
quent effects on the interaction of HFT algorithms have had two distinct
phases. Traces in price data of the first phase, in 2011–2012, were found by
economists Shkilko and Sokolov (2016). In that phase, a number of HFT
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firms had created microwave links between Chicago and New Jersey, and seem
to have used them above all for ‘picking-off’ the stale prices of market-making
algorithms still dependent on fibre-optic cables. When rain interrupted the
microwave links, those ‘making’ algorithms were able to resume market-
making without being picked-off, and, as Shkilko and Sokolov demonstrate,
standard measures of liquidity temporarily improved.
The second phase began after a communications supplier, McKay Brothers,
created a new microwave link between Chicago and New Jersey in 2012, using
the fastest available technology and choosing a route very close to the geodesic
(the geodesic, or great circle, is the shortest path on the earth’s surface between
two given points). McKay has subsequently kept refining the link to keep it at
least as fast as any of the privately-owned links. Since 2012, the McKay link
(widely used by market-making firms) has given their algorithms a degree of
protection from being picked-off. In this second phase, the effect of rain on
the interaction of algorithms seems to have reversed. Now, if it rains sufficiently
heavily to interrupt the McKay link, market-making firms cannot know for
certain that the private links used by ‘taking’ algorithms have also failed. So,
reports SJ, market-making algorithms have to ‘widen spreads’, as market par-
ticipants put it: reduce the prices of their bids and increase the prices of their
offers, so lowering the risk of being picked-off (but also reducing one of the
standard measures of liquidity).
Note that – in line with late ANT’s ‘enactment materialism’ – the vulnerability
of microwave transmission to rain is not a fixed physical effect: it increases as
higher frequencies are used. Of the frequencies available in the United States,
microwave engineers prefer the most reliable: 6 GHz. Unfortunately, reports
SJ, that band is ‘crowded’ near the Chicago-New Jersey geodesic (microwave
signals at the same frequency can interfere with each other), so keeping close
to the geodesic requires use of higher frequencies more vulnerable to rain: 11,
18 and sometimes even 23 GHz. The influence of rain on the interaction of algor-
ithms is, furthermore, not found in Europe. The European analogue of the
Chicago-New Jersey geodesic is the microwave route from London to Frank-
furt’s FR2. (Perhaps fortunately for the generally unappealing prospects for
UK finance post-Brexit, Hibernia’s undersea cable – via which the fastest
signals arrive in Europe from Chicago and the other US datacentres – makes
landfall in the United Kingdom, near Brean on the Bristol Channel. The
signals arrive in Greater London before transmission to Frankfurt.) McKay
Brothers was able to build its London-Frankfurt link using only 6 GHz, so
rain has little effect and ‘making’ algorithms in Europe therefore do not need
to widen spreads when it rains as their US counterparts need to (SJ).
Taking III: market-impact trading
The above two forms of ‘taking’ most likely account for the bulk of the inter-
action between ‘making’ and ‘taking’ HFT algorithms. There are, however,
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other forms of ‘taking’ that involve the prediction not just of overall price
changes but of the future actions of ‘making’ algorithms. One is ‘market-
impact trading’, in which an algorithm reflexively exploits the likely influence
of its own actions on other algorithms. One version of this, described by inter-
viewees AC and CR, involves identifying situations in which many of the bids or
offers in the order book are from small firms that will ‘cut their losses’ (CR) or
‘puke’ (AC; i.e. liquidate their positions at an unfavourable price) if prices move
against them by more than a certain amount. If a well-capitalized firm’s algor-
ithm can detect a ‘weak-hand moment’ of this kind, it can ‘sweep’ or ‘swipe’
(CR) the order book, for example by executing against all the bids at multiple
price levels, so driving the market down, forcing ‘weak-hand’ algorithms to
liquidate inventories at temporarily low prices, and profiting – often surpris-
ingly modestly, given the scale of the trade – from the difference between
those prices and the average price in the ‘swipe’ sales:
It’s amazing, you see those swipes and they’re huge swipes, millions and millions
and millions of dollars underlying value, and if you look at it, the actual profit of
one of these trades is $2,000 or something like that. (CR)
Taking IV: cat and mouse
‘Swiping’ is a crude, aggregate way of exploiting predictable behaviour by other
algorithms, but ‘taking’ algorithms can also do this far more subtly. Predictabil-
ity can, for example, arise from ‘making’ algorithms’ pervasive use of linear
regression equations to combine widely-used signals (of the kind in Table 1)
into a price prediction. As interviewee AJ said, ‘taking’ can involve an algorithm
predicting other algorithms’ predictions: ‘What do you think the [price predic-
tion] will be in a minute, in 30 seconds, in a millisecond, in 10 minutes?’ If a
taking algorithm can anticipate the typical prediction, it can anticipate how
other algorithms will react. If, for example, market-making algorithms are
trading the ‘ES’ (the index future corresponding to the S&P500 share index),
they will very likely be receiving ‘signals’ from the market for the ‘NQ’ (the
index future, also traded in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s datacentre, cor-
responding to the Nasdaq-100 share index). A ‘taking’ algorithm can predict
movements in the market for the NQ (for example, by analysis of the balance
of bids and offers in the order book for the NQ), and then anticipate how the
price predictions of the algorithms making markets in the ES will change in
response to those movements. The algorithm can thus sometimes identify a
‘coming [order] book imbalance’ in the ES, and therefore a predictable shift
in price quotations from which it can profit (interviewee CG).
Even more subtle is for a ‘taking’ algorithm to ‘predict what this guy [this
specific market-making algorithm] is going to do’, and thus profitably play a
‘game of cat and mouse’ (CG). If, for example, a specific market-making algor-
ithm can be identified, and observed repeatedly, it can be possible to infer when
it is approaching an inventory limit and will begin to ‘shade’ its prices. A
Donald MacKenzie: ‘Making’, ‘taking’ and the material political economy of
algorithmic trading 515
sophisticated ‘taking’ algorithm can then take on a trading position in the antici-
pation of being able to liquidate it at a profit against those shaded prices. The
‘shading’, and thus the profitability of the trade, will typically be small (of the
order of the minimum price increment: for example, one cent per share, as in
Figure 3). If, however, the algorithmic behaviour that has been identified is
repetitive and frequent, such small profits can accumulate.
A ‘taking’ algorithm successfully playing a ‘game of cat and mouse’ with a
specific ‘making’ algorithm is perhaps the most demanding computationally
of all the forms of taking. The volumes of data generated by financial markets
are huge (and anonymous), and established statistical techniques such as
linear regression are not well suited for identifying the ‘signatures’ of specific
algorithms in these masses of data: more recent machine-learning techniques
are needed. Also required is a powerful grid of multiple computers on which
to implement these techniques. This grid can run ‘offline’ (with programs
running overnight or at weekends if necessary) when ‘signatures’ are being
searched for; the ‘taking’ algorithms that are the result of this research have
to be simpler to run – as they have to – on a single computer and fast. They
are, however, not very simple. Here, the state-of-the-art technologies that are
a result of the speed race are used not to achieve nanosecond reaction times
but to permit more complex computation. As CG puts it: ‘speed allows you
to do complicated things in the same time’ in which ‘others do simple things’.
The game of algorithmic ‘cat and mouse’ traditionally relied on human intelli-
gence – ‘one of our traders has a friend who works on that [firm’s trading] desk’
(BM) – and the human capacity to spot ‘hints of [order] size, timing, what price
levels, how they hedge’ that are characteristic of a firm’s algorithms (BM). More
recently, however, machine learning techniques have, as noted above, started
being applied to the ‘game’. This is facilitated, reports CG, by technological
changes in exchange systems. ‘Most people’s [computer] systems are very deter-
ministic,’ he says. For example, the time taken by an HFT firm’s system to
respond to an incoming signal (e.g. by sending the exchange a new order)
varies between firms, but for each particular firm it tends to be reasonably con-
stant. This creates a potentially identifiable ‘signature’, but one previously
masked by inconsistencies among exchanges in how time is measured and by
‘jitter’ in exchange systems (random fluctuation in the time taken to process
orders). Precise atomic-clock synchronization to the global time standard,
UTC, and greater determinism in exchange systems (increasingly programmed
in C++, which allows fuller control of the material implementation of compu-
tational processes) have, however, removed much of that masking.
Alternative material orderings
As far as I can tell, this ‘unmasking’ is an inadvertent material effect, not one
sought by those who run exchanges. They are, however, by no means always
neutral observers of how ‘making’ and ‘taking’ algorithms interact. When
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they intervene it is most usually to encourage ‘making’. There is no evidence in
my interviews that this is because they regard ‘making’ as ‘more moral’ than
‘taking’. Their fear, rather, is of ‘empty screens’ (interviewee GI) – order books
devoid of bids and offers – which make an exchange fatally unattractive to
traders and institutional investors. Sometimes, exchanges encourage ‘making’
with economic incentives: for example, small payments (known as ‘rebates’) to
those who place ‘making’ orders that subsequently are executed against. Sometimes,
too, exchanges protect making algorithms from HFT ‘takers’ by having rules that
constrain the latter. For example, the new European stock exchange, Aquis, has a
rule banning proprietary trading firms from ‘taking’. Its chief executive told the
Financial Times that ‘aggressive predatory trading’ was damaging ‘posted liquidity’,
that is, the numbers of ‘making’ orders in its order books (Stafford, 2016).10
From the viewpoint of this paper, however, the most interesting intervention
by exchanges in making/taking interaction is their use of material devices. The
most famous such device (highlighted in Michael Lewis’s 2014 best-seller Flash
boys) is a 60-kilometre coil of fibre-optic cable installed by the new US stock
exchange, IEX, through which all incoming orders to IEX (and all market
data from IEX) have to pass, slowing them down by 350 microseconds. The
coil is strikingly reminiscent of Latour’s famous example of material politics,
the traffic-slowing ‘sleeping policeman’ (Latour, 1999, pp. 187–188), but it is
a less than decisive intervention in the interaction between ‘making’ and
‘taking’ algorithms, because it slows down both categories equally.11 That did
not, however, prevent the coil sparking fierce controversy among market par-
ticipants in the United States.
Also deeply controversial, although much less well known, was a 2016 propo-
sal from another small exchange, the Chicago Stock Exchange, to install a soft-
ware-implemented ‘speed bump’ that would slow ‘taking’ orders, while leaving
‘making’ orders and cancellations (by registered market-makers) unaffected.
The staff of the US stock market regulator, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, initially approved the proposal, but Republican Commissioner Michael
Piwowar opposed that decision, which was then put on hold. In April 2018, the
Chicago Exchange – also at the centre of a furore around its possible sale to a
group including Chinese investors – was bought by the Intercontinental
Exchange, owner of the New York Stock Exchange, and it remains unclear
whether the proposed speed bump will be implemented.
As a result, the introduction of material devices and procedures to shape
making-taking interaction has mostly been found in foreign exchange trading,
in which there is no need to seek regulatory approval and in which banks,
with their slow technical systems, are still important market-makers and
retain considerable power and influence. The most sophisticated of these
devices is a module, described by interviewee GS, that was added to the
Thomson Reuters trading system in 2016. The module examines incoming
buy and sell orders for each of the currency pairs being traded, classifies
them as either ‘taking’ or ‘making’, and adds them to the corresponding
buffer.12 The first order to enter an empty buffer starts a ‘timer’ that runs
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for three milliseconds (thousandths of a second), at which point the buffer is
emptied by sending the bids or offers it contains to the matching engine in a
random order.13 Randomization stops, e.g. the fastest market-making algorithm
always getting to the head of queues, and, crucially, cancellations of orders are
not placed in a buffer, but sent to the matching engine immediately. This
gives substantial protection to market-making algorithms: if the market
moves, they have three milliseconds (a long time, by HFT standards) to
cancel their stale quotes before they are picked off.
Conclusion: material political economy
The installation of the Reuters module excited little media interest, but never-
theless exemplifies the phenomenon to which ‘material political economy’
points: the possibility of alternative material orderings that differ in economi-
cally consequential ways. In particular, as just noted, the module is designed
to alleviate the arms race in speed in algorithmic trading – though it does not
solve it: no modification to any one system could; and other proposals exist.14
That arms race sometimes disturbs even those whose business it is. Every so
often, my interviews are punctuated by an interviewee spontaneously reflecting
on it. For example, the need for nanosecond speeds means that many HFT algor-
ithms are no longer implemented in conventional software but directly in hardware:
in specialized silicon chips called ‘field-programmable gate arrays’ or FPGAs (see
Figure 4).15 In February 2018, a specialist in the use of FPGAs in HFT broke
off telling me how sophisticated rejigging of the patterns of connections within
FPGAs could ‘shave 5–10 nanoseconds’ off the time taken to process signals:
Those engineers that spend day and night on this, it’s ridiculous. It’s quite ridi-
culous…mind-numbing… a lot of people with extended training… shaving
nanoseconds… you could put that brainpower to something else… something
different. (Interviewee UC)
The net present value of the stakes in even the simplest form of interaction
between making and taking algorithms (the picking-off of stale quotes, which
is, as noted above, one of the two key drivers of the speed race) may be as
high as $100 billion (Budish, 2017). Much of that, however, does not crystallize
as profit to HFT firms, but takes the form of otherwise unnecessary spending
on technology. While faster FPGAs might conceivably have eventual uses in
different spheres, that seems unlikely for other speed-race investments such
as marginally speeded-up microwave links. What disturbs some insiders
seems to be a nagging sense of scarce resources being wasted: either simply
their firm’s resources, or (as in the case of interviewee UC) social resources.
Just occasionally, too, the material political economy of HFT erupts into the
formal political system, at least locally. The geodesic from London to Frankfurt
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crosses the east Kent coast near the little village of Richborough. In 2016, two
communications companies owned by HFT firms applied for planning per-
mission to build two huge – 10-foot wide, 1000-foot tall – microwave masts
there. (Microwave transmission requires a direct ‘line-of-sight’ path from
source to receiver, and the sea crossing from Richborough to the Continent is
sufficiently long that a tall mast is needed. Without the latter, microwave
links have to cross further south, where the English Channel is narrower, and
that deviation from the geodesic means a transmission time that is around 10
microseconds longer: interviewee SJ.) The economic value of even an appar-
ently minor speeding-up of an important microwave link is indicated by the
promise of one of the companies to pay at least £100,000 a year to a commu-
nity-managed project fund.16 Considerable opposition was, however, sparked,
involving not just those who live close to the proposed masts but also, e.g. His-
toric England, guardians of the remains of Richborough Fort, an important
Roman administrative/military base. After much local debate, Dover District
councillors voted in January 2017 to refuse planning permission for the masts.
In the case of the Richborough masts, the material political economy of algorith-
mic trading would have been all too visible. Such cases, however, are likely to
remain rare. We are going to have to dig beneath the surface of the financial
system to unearth that material political economy. One of its effects, for example,
is what may become a substantial shift in Europe away from exchanges’ anonymous
order books, which can be ‘seen’ (at least in technologically mediated ways) by all
Figure 4 A field-programmable gate array (FPGA) in a ‘development kit’ for program-
ming and testing. The FPGA is the large central chip with white paste on it.
Source: Author’s fieldwork photograph.
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human and algorithmic participants, towards other, more private, forms of auto-
mated trading involving webs of bilateral relationships among firms that disclose
their identities to each other. In order books, as many market-making interviewees
point out, their algorithms are vulnerable to being picked-off (despite the partial
protection offered by the McKay Brothers’ links); they suffer losses when order
books are ‘swept’, etc. Such risks are minimized if market-making algorithms are
in direct electronic contact with – for instance, receiving electronic ‘requests for
quotation’ from – a firm known to be simply an institutional investor with no inter-
est in or capacity to pick-off stale quotes. This may bring benefits (there is little
need for extreme speed; interviewees who are enthusiasts for the shift said that insti-
tutional investors can receive better prices in an ongoing bilateral relationship), but
it may leave exchanges’ order books – the more ‘public’ form of price formation –
depleted and ‘toxic’ (i.e. populated by orders that could not be executed bilaterally
because the risk involved seemed too high: ‘the trades that no-one wants’ [intervie-
wee GM]). Yet another – again still subterranean – issue of material political
economy is the growing determinism of exchanges’ computer systems, referred
to above. As random fluctuations in processing time are reduced, the algorithms
of HFT firms without the fastest technology will ‘win the trade’ less and less
often. Deterministic material systems are thus likely to be ‘winner-takes-all’
systems, with the potential to lead to growing dominance of trading by a diminish-
ing number of ultra-high-tech firms.
The particular material political economy of HFT is new and esoteric. Even
other forms of algorithmic trading do not yet manifest the extremity of HFT’s
speed race, either because slow human beings remain in the loop, or technical
systems and material procedures have features that limit the advantages that
speed brings.17 The underlying phenomenon of the importance ofmaterial order-
ings to economic life is, however, not new: slavery, after all, rested upon guns and
whips, manacles and slave ships. Nor, indeed, is material political economy a
novelty: volume one ofCapital, with its detailed attention to the changingmaterial
orderings of production, can be read as in this genre (MacKenzie, 1984). As econ-
omic life becomes ever more algorithmic, and takes place to an ever-increasing
extent in giant datacentres (let us not forget, for example, the elementary but
environmentally important fact that datacentres consume huge amounts of elec-
tricity), material political economy is a tradition that urgently needs revivified.
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Notes
1 The term ‘algorithm’ is used here to refer not just to a set of instructions sufficiently
precise that they can be implemented as a computer program, but to that program
running on a physical computer system and having material effects on other systems.
For wider research in ‘critical algorithm studies’, which cannot be reviewed here for
reasons of space, see the evolving bibliography at https://socialmediacollective.org/
reading-lists/critical-algorithm-studies/.
2 See Laumonier’s blog, https://sniperinmahwah.wordpress.com. (Mahwah, NJ, is
the location of the New York Stock Exchange’s datacentre.)
3 See also, e.g. the Dingpolitik of Latour (2005) or the subtle reflections in Barry (2002)
on how ‘politics’ (in the conventional sense of the word) can have ‘anti-political’ effects in
closing down potential contestation.
4 A different aspect of the ‘material political economy’ of HFT is explored in MacK-
enzie (2017): the influence of processes that are in a broad sense ‘political’ on the ‘signals’
(patterns of data) that are available for price prediction by HFT algorithms.
5 Practitioners’ alternative terms for ‘make/take’ – e.g. ‘add/remove’ or ‘passive/
aggressive’ – can also be misread as inherently moralizing, and referring to ‘making’ as
‘passive’ misleads differently, because a making algorithm typically has to be continually
active, cancelling and replacing bids and offers.
6 Trading teams in compartmentalized firms often welcome the separation, not wanting
others, even within the same firm, to profit from ‘their’ ideas. Other reasons for strict com-
partmentalization include avoiding concentrations of risk caused by teams imitating each
other’s trading, and persuading exchanges and regulators to allow one team’s algorithms
to trade with another’s. This can easily happen accidentally, and ‘self-trading’ is normally
prohibited, because it can be used to create a manipulative ‘false price’.
7 The need to limit this paper’s length means occasional inexact formulations, such as
‘exchange’: not all the trading venues in which HFT is active are registered exchanges,
despite having exchange-like roles.
8 See, e.g. Baron et al. (2012); Hagströmer and Nordén (2013); Benos and Sagade
(2016). Benos and Sagade, for example, use regulatory data to classify HFT participants
in the London Stock Exchange as ‘passive’ (makers), ‘neutral’ or ‘aggressive’ (takers):
‘aggressive HFTs take liquidity 82% of the time, whereas the passive do so only 11%
of the time’ (2016, p. 63).
9 These are what in HFT are called ‘wire-to-wire’ or ‘tick-to-trade’ times: the delay
between the arrival of a price signal and the dispatch of an order or cancellation.
10 It seems as if the issue was mainly ‘sweeps’ of multiple levels of the order book
(interviewee EA), but whether these were ‘market impact trading’ of the kind discussed
above is unclear.
11 The main point of the coil is to inhibit a very particular form of ‘taking’. Much
trading on IEX is ‘midpoint matching’, in which trades are consummated at the midpoint
of the highest bid price and lowest offer price on all the US exchanges. If a ‘taking’ algor-
ithm detected that the midpoint calculated by IEX’s system was out-of-date, it might be
able profitably to ‘take’. However, the datafeeds that inform IEX’s calculation of the mid-
point do not go through the coil, so the midpoint will be updated before any ‘taking’
order has emerged from the coil.
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12 There are separate buffers for ‘making’ orders at different prices.
13 The randomization is by firm: all the orders in the buffer from the same firm are
grouped, and only one of them is implemented before the algorithm moves to an
order submitted by the next firm in the randomly-ordered list of firms. For more
detail on the module and its rationale, see Melton (2017).
14 In particular, Budish et al. (2015) argue that the underlying cause of the arms race is
continuous trading, and propose replacing it with frequent but discrete auctions.
15 Even with the best current technology, says CR, it would take far too long (around a
microsecond) to send an incoming signal from a network interface card to a conventional
computer central processing unit and back again.
16 See http://www.richboroughmast.co.uk/community-benefits/community-
benefit-fund, accessed 30 April 2018.
17 For example, the automated advertising auctions triggered by users’ Google
searches are discrete, single-point-in-time, auctions, in which, e.g. the algorithm that
bids first has no advantage. There is an echo here of the material reordering proposed
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